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I. INTRODUCTION
The proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the
freedom to express “the thought that we hate.”1 Today’s decision rests on a
very different principle: no freedom for expression that offends prevailing
standards of political correctness in our country’s institutions of higher
learning.2
In a line of Supreme Court cases concerning restrictions on speech
in a limited public forum the Court holds that “any access barrier”
must be both reasonable and viewpoint neutral.3  In April 2010, the
stipulated “all-comers policy” in place at the University of California,
Hastings College of Law (Hastings) survived a facial challenge to this
test.  The Court held Hastings’s open-access condition on Registered
Student Organization (RSO) status was both reasonable in light of the
purposes of the limited public forum and viewpoint neutral.4  The stu-
dent branch of the Christian Legal Society (CLS) at Hastings was thus
denied RSO status because it refused to admit members unless they
were willing to affirm their belief in certain Christian doctrines and
refrain from “participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral
lifestyle.”5
While on its face the all-comers policy withstood a constitutional
challenge, on remand the lower courts should examine the question of
1. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez (CLS), 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3000 (2010) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., id. at 2984.
4. Id. at 2995.
5. Id. at 2995–96 (Stevens, J., concurring).  For more information on the Christian
Legal Society, see CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org (last visited
Nov. 2, 2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB206.txt unknown Seq: 3  6-DEC-11 14:58
588 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:586
whether the policy was applied unconstitutionally.6  Hastings selec-
tively enforced its policy against CLS while allowing other RSOs simi-
larly situated to limit membership and leadership positions to those
students who “agree[d] with the organization’s beliefs and purposes.”7
Because Hastings’s policy was selectively enforced any reason put
forth by Hastings to justify its policy should be labeled defunct.8  The
purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that, while the policy in ques-
tion may have appeared textually both reasonable and viewpoint neu-
tral, it was applied in such a way that amounted to viewpoint
discrimination and violated the CLS’s First Amendment right to ex-
pressive association.
Part II of this Note will set the judicial foundation governing First
Amendment expressive association rights in a limited public forum,
such as the one created at Hastings.  Part III will present the relevant
facts, holding, and reasoning of the Supreme Court in its decision to
uphold the all-comers policy.  Part IV will analyze the policy as the
university applied it.  When juxtaposed with Supreme Court prece-
dent governing viewpoint discrimination against religious perspec-
tives, Hastings’s actions should prove unconstitutional.  Furthermore,
the court on remand, when examining the reasonableness of the policy
as applied, will likely be persuaded that the policy does not pass the
reasonableness standard.  Finally, Part V will present possible conclu-
sions, including forcing Hastings to: (1) grant CLS an exemption from
the all-comers policy or (2) to apply the policy to all RSOs equally.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Forum Analysis: A Brief Explanation
The Constitution of the United States of America guarantees:
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”9
The right to associate for the purpose of engaging in the expression of
a certain idea is included under this provision of the First Amend-
ment.10  This guarantee however, is not without limitation.  For exam-
6. See infra Part V.
7. CLS, at 3004–05 n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Appellant at 14, Chris-
tian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-15956), 2006
WL 3420535).  For examples of Hastings selective enforcement, see infra note
129.
8. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001) (“Because the
restriction is viewpoint discriminatory, we need not decide whether it is unrea-
sonable in light of the purposes served by the forum.”).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–19 (1984). For an analysis as to
why religious student groups constitute expressive association see, Note, Leaving
Religious Students Speechless: Public Universities and Antidiscrimination Poli-
cies and Religious Student Organizations, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2882, 2884–88
(2005).
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ple, in the interest of both public and private safety, a speaker is not
permitted to yell, “FIRE!” in a crowded theatre.11  A group is re-
stricted from sending death threats to the President of the United
States.12  While these restrictions may seem obvious, the Supreme
Court has also created standards for evaluating limitations placed on
one’s First Amendment rights “depending on the character” of the set-
ting (or forum) where the speech takes place.13  Put another way, “the
extent to which the Government can control access [to a forum] de-
pends on the nature of the relevant forum.”14  This “forum analysis”
has divided government property into three categories: (1) traditional
public forums—e.g., sidewalks and parks;15 (2) government desig-
nated public forums—where “government property that has not tradi-
tionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up for
that purpose;”16 and (3) limited public forums—a forum created by a
government entity that is to be used “by certain groups or dedicated
solely to the discussion of certain subjects.”17
The standard used to determine if “a state has unconstitutionally
excluded a private speaker from use of a public forum depend[s] on the
nature of the forum.”18  While the judiciary has granted discretionary
power for the government “to preserve [its] property under its control
for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,”19 this power is reined in
under the doctrine of scrutiny.  For example, any content-based re-
strictions placed on speech in the traditional public forum or the gov-
ernment designated public forum are subject to strict scrutiny—“the
restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling govern-
11. Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection
of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic.”).
12. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (upholding the constitution-
ality of a statute limiting free speech rights of those who make “true threats”
against the President).
13. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
14. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
15. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (“This court long
ago recognized that members of the public retain strong free speech rights when
they venture into public streets and parks, ‘which have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for pur-
poses of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at
45)).
16. Id. at 1132 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
17. Id. (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7); see also Edward J. Neveril, “Objective” Ap-
proaches to the Public Forum Doctrine: The First Amendment at the Mercy of Ar-
chitectural Chicanery, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1185, 1193 (1996) (providing a more in-
depth description and history of the forum doctrine).
18. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (citing Perry, 460
U.S. at 44).
19. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39, 47 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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mental interest.”20  The level of scrutiny in the limited public forum
however, is more relaxed—a government entity may impose restric-
tions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.21  Because
the RSO program at Hastings represented a limited public forum it is
imperative for the reader to have an understanding of the standard
used when evaluating speech in this forum.  The Supreme Court
noted:
When the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is not required to
and does not allow persons to engage in every type of speech. The State may
be justified in “reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of
certain topics.” The State’s power to restrict speech, however, is not without
limits. The restriction must not discriminate against speech on the basis of
viewpoint, and the restriction must be “reasonable in light of the purposes
served by the forum.”22
What constitutes viewpoint discrimination and unreasonableness in a
limited public forum has been examined at great length in recent Su-
preme Court decisions.23
1. Healy v. James: Political Viewpoint Discrimination Against a
Student Group
In 1972, a group of students attending Central Connecticut State
College desired to receive official recognition as a student group in or-
der to establish a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS).24  The students filed a request with the student affairs commit-
tee and stated three purposes of the group:
[1]provide “a forum of discussion and self education for students developing an
analysis of American society”;[2] serve as “an agency for integrating thought
with action so as to bring about constructive changes”; and . . . [3] “provide a
20. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (“Because a
principal purpose of the traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas,
speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest. Similarly, when the Government has intentionally desig-
nated a place . . . as a public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a com-
pelling government interest.” (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45)).
21. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806). See generally
Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99 (1996)
(providing definitions, examples, history, and analysis of viewpoint
discrimination).
22. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; Cor-
nelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
23. See generally Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819; Lamb’s
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
24. Healy, 408 U.S. at 170.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB206.txt unknown Seq: 6  6-DEC-11 14:58
2011] DUCK, DUCK, GOOSE . . . 591
coordinating body for relating the problems of leftists students” with other
interested groups on campus and in the community.25
The reviewing committee took no issue with the group’s proposed pur-
poses but concerned itself with the relationship between the student
group and the National SDS organization.26  The national branches
for SDS carried with them a reputation for campus disruption.27  Once
established that the student group was loosely, if at all, connected
with the national organization, the committee approved the applica-
tion.28  The committee based its approval “on the belief that varying
viewpoints should be represented on campus and that since the Young
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the Young Republi-
cans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed recognized status, a group
should be available with which ‘left wing’ students might identify.”29
Days later the university president rejected the committee’s ap-
proval and issued a statement indicating the group was not to be af-
forded official recognition.30  The president felt the “organization’s
philosophy was antithetical to the school’s policies . . . .”31  The group
was denied access to campus communication facilities, including bul-
letin boards and the school newspaper.32  It could not hold meetings in
classrooms or even congregate at the campus coffee shop, thus jeop-
ardizing the group’s growth and even its existence.33  Running out of
options, the students filed a complaint alleging their First Amend-
ment associational rights were violated when the college president re-
fused to grant them official recognition.34
On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the possible reasons be-
hind the president’s decision to deny official recognition and held:
“The mere disagreement of the President with the group’s philosophy
affords no reason to deny it recognition.”35  No matter how much the
president of the university disapproved of or disagreed with the
25. Id. at 172 (quoting Appendix to 2d Cir. Opinion at 1135–39, Healy v. James, 445
F.2d 1122 (2d. Cir. 1971) (No. 733, 35828)).
26. Id. at 172–73.
27. Id.; see also Ben Gibberd, To the Ramparts (Gently), N.Y. TIMES (March 23, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/nyregion/thecity/23sds.html (describing typi-
cal campus protests and disruptions performed by the SDS).
28. Healy, 408 U.S. at 172–74.
29. Id. at 174.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 175.
32. Id. at 176.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 177.
35. Id. at 187; see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Gov-
ernment Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1919, 1936 (2006) (“I have spoken so far of
one area in which the government must fund the exercise of constitutional rights:
the No Governmental Viewpoint Discrimination Principle, which says that a gov-
ernment program benefiting a broad range of viewpoints may not exclude those
viewpoints that the government disfavors.”).
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group’s views, to deny recognition based on this disdain was prohib-
ited.36  After expressing its reasoning, the Court quoted Justice Black
in an effort to reemphasize the importance of viewpoint neutrality: “I
do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms . . . of
speech . . . and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be
accorded to the ideas [or viewpoints] we hate or sooner or later they
will be denied to the ideas we cherish.”37
2. Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District: Speech Otherwise Permitted
In 1993 the Supreme Court faced, once again, the issue of whether
a restriction on speech in a limited public forum violated a party’s
First Amendment rights.  In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District,38 a local church brought suit alleging that a
school district’s refusal to allow use of the school’s facilities to show a
film series on family values from a Christian perspective constituted
viewpoint discrimination.  A New York law authorized school boards
to “adopt reasonable regulations for the use of school property . . . .”39
The law set forth a list of permitted uses, including: “social, civic and
recreational meetings . . . and other uses pertaining to the welfare of
the community . . . .”40  Pursuant to New York law, the school board
for Center Moriches Union Free School District issued its own rules
and regulations governing the use of school property when not in use
for school purposes.41  Rule seven stated: “[t]he school premises shall
not be used by any group for religious purposes.”42  Lamb’s Chapel, an
evangelical church, applied twice to the district for permission to use
the school facilities to show a six-part film series on the importance of
family values from a Christian perspective.43  The district denied the
application for fear of an Establishment Clause violation, on grounds
that the films “appear[ed] to be church related . . . .”44
36. Healy, 408 U.S. at 187–88.
37. Id. at 188 (quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)).
38. 508 U.S. 384, 384 (1993).
39. Id. at 386 (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 1988 and Supp. 1993)).
40. Id. (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (1)(c) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. at 387.  For a compilation of cases, laws, and rules governing the use of public
school property during non-school hours, see C.T. Foster, Annotation, Use of Pub-
lic School Premises for Religious Purposes During Nonschool Time, 79 A.L.R.2d.
1148 (originally published in 1961).
42. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387 (alteration in original) (quoting Appendix to Ap-
pellate Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 57a, Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(No. 91-2024), 1992 WL 12012085 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 388–89 (“The District denied the first application, saying that ‘[t]his film
does appear to be church related and therefore your request must be refused.’ The
second application for permission to use school premises for showing the film se-
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The Supreme Court recognized the school as a limited public forum
and quickly reminded the parties that control over such a forum re-
quires viewpoint neutrality and must be reasonable in light of the pur-
poses of the forum.45  The Court found the film series that Lamb’s
Chapel wished to show dealt with a subject otherwise permissible
under New York law, and “its exhibition was denied solely because the
series dealt with the subject from a religious standpoint.”46  The Court
then stated a foundational principle in the recognition of viewpoint
discrimination: “the First Amendment forbids the government to regu-
late speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense
of others.”47  To permit school property to be used for the presentation
of all views concerning family issues and child-rearing except those
dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint amounted
to discrimination on the basis of viewpoint.48  Lamb’s Chapel was ex-
cluded from the forum strictly because its message, otherwise includi-
ble in that setting, was delivered from a religious perspective.49  The
school district violated the First Amendment when it denied Lamb’s
Chapel access to the limited public forum solely to “suppress the point
of view . . . [it] espouse[d] on an otherwise includible subject.”50
3. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia: Religious Viewpoint Discrimination at a
Public University
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Vir-
ginia,51 the Supreme Court found that the University of Virginia vio-
lated the First Amendment rights of a Christian student group when
it refused to pay the printing fees for the group’s student magazine
based on the magazine’s Christian perspective.  The university cre-
ated a program that authorized the payment of outside contractors for
ries, which described it as a ‘Family oriented movie—from a Christian perspec-
tive,’ was denied using identical language.”).
45. Id. at 392–94.  The Court specifically stated:
[A]lthough a speaker may be excluded from a non-public forum if he
wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the fo-
rum . . . or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose espe-
cial benefit  the forum was created . . . the government violates the First
Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the
point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotatin marks omitted) (quoting Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
46. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
47. Id. (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
804 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’
Ass’n 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)).
51. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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printing and other publication costs associated with the creation of a
variety of student magazines.52  Due to an unfounded fear of violating
the Establishment Clause, the college created an exception to the pro-
gram—it would withhold authorization and refuse to accord funds to
any publication that “primarily promote[d] or manifest[ed] a particu-
lar belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”53  Wide Awake
Productions (WAP), a contracted independent organization officially
recognized as a student group on campus, published Wide Awake: A
Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia.54  The magazine
discussed issues relevant to college students including professor inter-
views, music reviews, and missionary work from a Christian view-
point.55  The University of Virginia refused to provide financial
benefits to WAP, because, in its view, the publication triggered the
university’s exception to the program.56
The issue addressed to the Supreme Court was whether the exclu-
sion constituted viewpoint discrimination against WAP and therefore
violated the group’s First Amendment rights.57  The Court labeled the
university’s funding program as a limited public forum and reminded
the college that once it established a limited public forum it “must re-
spect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.”58  The university would
be permitted to discriminate on the basis of content so long as the pur-
poses of the forum were preserved.59  For example, the college was not
constitutionally required to authorize or pay the publication fees for a
non-student organization magazine.60  Such an action would fall
outside the scope of the purposes of the forum.  However, if the univer-
sity refused to authorize payment for the printing fees of a student
publication that otherwise fell within the forum’s limitations solely
52. Id. at 822.
53. Id. at 822–23.
54. Id. at 825–26.
55. Id. at 827.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 828.
58. Id. at 829.
59. Id. at 829–30.
60. Id.  The Court specifically stated:
Thus, in determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits
of the forum it has created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is
legitimate, we have observed a distinction between, on the one hand,
content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the pur-
poses of that limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimi-
nation, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum’s limitations.
Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983)). See generally Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Con-
tent Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595
(2003) (explaining the distinctions between content and viewpoint based
restrictions).
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based on the group’s viewpoint, the university had presumably vio-
lated the First Amendment.61  Relying on its decision in Lamb’s
Chapel, the Court pointed out the blatant viewpoint discrimination
exhibited by the university when it denied WAP financial reimburse-
ment for its publication because the group’s magazine was written
from a Christian perspective.62
In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor called on Supreme
Court precedent to remind the University of its error: “We have time
and again held that the government generally may not treat people
differently based on the God or gods they worship, or do not wor-
ship.”63  The University of Virginia created a limited public forum
through its funding program and when it denied WAP the benefits of
that program based on the group’s Christian standpoint it not only
treated WAP differently based on the God it worshipped, it violated
the First Amendment to the Constitution through viewpoint
discrimination.
4. Good News Club v. Milford Central School: Viewpoint
Discrimination and Reasonableness
More recently, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School Dis-
trict,64 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decisions in both Lamb’s
Chapel and Rosenberger, striking down a community use policy that
forbade the afterschool use of public school facilities for religious pur-
poses.  With facts strikingly similar to those in Lamb’s Chapel, the
Milford Central School District denied access to the cafeteria for after-
school use by the Good News Club—a private Christian organization
for children ages six to twelve.65  The club’s purpose was to educate
children on the Bible and to discuss its application in their lives.66
The school considered the club’s activities to be “the equivalent of re-
ligious worship” and, because of a tenuous fear of the Establishment
Clause, denied the Good News Club access to school facilities.67
61. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30.
62. Id. at 831 (“We conclude, . . . that here, as in Lamb’s Chapel, viewpoint discrimi-
nation is the proper way to interpret the University’s objections to Wide
Awake.”).
63. Id. at 846 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 714 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
64. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
65. Id. at 103.
66. Id.; see also What is a Good News Club?, CHILD EVANGELISM FELLOWSHIP, http://
www.cefonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=13&
Itemid=100049/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2010) (providing the history and purpose of
The Good News Club).
67. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 104 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Brief of Appellee at 4, Good News Club, 202 F.3d 502 (No. 98-9494), 1999 WL
33629937).
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The Good News Club filed suit alleging a violation of its First
Amendment rights.68  On appeal the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and faced the question of whether denying access to The Good
News Club constituted viewpoint discrimination.69  Guided by its
analysis in previous cases, the Court noted the teaching of morals and
character development to children was a permissible purpose under
the school district’s policy.70  The court also found that when Milford
Central School denied The Good News Club access to its limited public
forum, it did so because the otherwise permissible subject matter be-
ing presented was taught from a Christian perspective.71  As dis-
cussed in both Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger, a restriction on speech
otherwise permissible in a limited public forum inflicted on a group
because of its religious perspective amounts to viewpoint discrimina-
tion and is a violation of the group’s First Amendment rights.72
The Good News decision is particularly poignant because it ex-
pounds the reasonableness prong of the limited public forum stan-
dard.  Recall that in a limited public forum any restriction on speech
must be viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purposes
served by the forum.73  In Good News, the Court twice addressed
whether a viewpoint discriminatory policy is ever justifiable.74  The
Court noted that while content-based discrimination may be justified
under strict scrutiny to avoid an Establishment Clause violation, it “is
not clear whether a State’s interest in avoiding an Establishment
Clause violation would justify viewpoint discrimination.”75  The Court
seems to answer this inquiry by concentrating on whether it is even
necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the restriction once view-
point discrimination has been established: “[b]ecause the restriction is
viewpoint discriminatory, we need not decide whether it is unreasona-
68. Id. at 98.
69. Id. at 106.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 109–10.
72. Id. at 106–10.  The Court expounded on its prior precedents, noting:
In Lamb’s Chapel, we held that a school district violated the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment when it excluded a private group from
presenting films at the school based solely on the films’ discussions of
family values from a religious perspective.  Likewise, in Rosenberger, we
held that a university’s refusal to fund a student publication because the
publication addressed issues from a religious perspective violated the
Free Speech Clause. Concluding that Milford’s exclusion of the Good
News Club based on its religious nature is indistinguishable from the
exclusions in these cases, we hold that the exclusion constitutes view-
point discrimination.
Id. at 107.
73. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (citing
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)).
74. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111–13.
75. Id at 113.
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ble in light of the purposes served by the forum.”76  This begs the
question: In a limited public forum is it ever justifiable to limit speech,
which would otherwise be permitted, because that speech is delivered
from a certain perspective?  After analyzing Supreme Court prece-
dent, the answer to that question appears to be in the negative.77
Once viewpoint discrimination has been established someone’s First
Amendment rights have been violated, and there is no need to discuss
the offending party’s justifications.
Whether the speech comes from a controversial political perspec-
tive as in Healy or a sectarian religious perspective as in Lamb’s
Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News, the creator of the limited public
forum must “respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.”78  Once
established that the speech in question is otherwise permissible
within the limitations of the forum, excluding that speech based on its
perspective or viewpoint violates the First Amendment to the Consti-
tution.79  Furthermore, the decision in Good News is dispositive—it is
not necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of a restriction on speech
once viewpoint discrimination is established.80  In Part III of this
Note, the background and relevant facts of the Christian Legal Society
decision are established for the purpose of analyzing the decision
under the afore-described First Amendment jurisprudence.
III. CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ: FACTS,
HOLDING, AND REASONING
A. The Registered Student Organization Program
Founded in 1878, Hastings College of Law, like many other institu-
tions, encourages students to organize “extracurricular associations
that ‘contribute to [the colleges] community and experience.’”81  These
groups foster an environment where students can intermingle aca-
demic and social interests in a place outside the classroom.82  In addi-
tion, these organizations further education and create a forum in
which students may “develop leadership skills.”83  Through its Regis-
tered Student Organization (RSO) program, Hastings offers official
recognition to student groups and supplies them with benefits such as:
financial assistance to subsidize events, access to law school communi-
cation channels, and permission to apply to use law school facilities
76. Id. at 107.
77. See supra Part II.
78. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
79. Id. at 829–30.
80. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113.
81. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez (CLS), 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2979.
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such as classrooms for group meetings or events.84  In exchange for
these benefits Hastings requires all student groups adhere to a non-
discrimination policy, which it interprets as an “all-comers policy,” re-
quiring all RSOs to “allow any student to participate, become a
member, or seek leadership positions in the organization regardless of
[her] status or belief.”85  This does not preclude an RSO from creating
neutral and generally applicable membership requirements, such as a
writing competition in the case of law journal, or mandating attend-
ance, and prohibiting gross misconduct.86  As long as a group’s bylaws
do not exclude a student based on his belief or status it will be
permitted.87
B. Procedural History
In September of 2004 the student branch of the Christian Legal
Society (CLS) submitted all necessary documentation to Hastings in
an effort to receive RSO status.88  Included in its proposed bylaws,
CLS set forth the group’s “Statement of Faith,” which included the
belief that “sexual activity should not occur outside of marriage be-
tween a man and a woman” thus, CLS excluded from affiliation any-
one who engaged in “unrepentant homosexual conduct.”89  Further,
through application of its bylaws, CLS also excluded students whose
religious convictions differed from those set forth in the Statement of
Faith.90  Several days after submitting its application for RSO status
CLS was denied recognition on the basis that its bylaws violated the
all-comers policy by excluding students based on religious beliefs and
sexual orientation.91  CLS then formally requested an exemption from
the policy and was denied.92
In October of 2004 CLS filed suit alleging a violation of its First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and expressive asso-
ciation.93  Applying the doctrine of forum analysis, both the District
Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that, on its face,
Hastings’s all-comers policy was reasonable in light of the purposes of
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2979 n.2.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2980.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2980–81 (“[T]o be one of our student recognized organizations . . . CLS must
open its membership to all students irrespective of their religious beliefs or sex-
ual orientation.”).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2981.
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the forum and was viewpoint neutral.94  CLS appealed the Ninth Cir-
cuit decision and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.95
C. Majority Opinion: An Invitation to Examine Selective
Enforcement
In its expansive opinion, the Supreme Court went to great lengths
to explain why it found Hastings’s all-comers policy to be reasonable.
The policy, the Court stated: (1) “ensures . . . leadership, educational,
and social opportunities . . . are available to all students”;96 (2) “helps
Hastings police the written terms of its nondiscrimination policy with-
out inquiring into an RSO’s motivation for membership restric-
tions”;97 (3) “brings together individuals with diverse backgrounds
and beliefs”;98 and (4) “conveys the Law School’s decision ‘to decline to
subsidize with public monies . . . conduct of which the people of Cali-
fornia disapprove.’”99  The Court continued to justify the policy by
pointing to the “alternative channels that remain open for [CLS-stu-
dent] communication to take place,”100 and denouncing CLS’s allega-
tion that the policy will invite “hostile takeovers” of student groups by
pointing to the absence of evidence that any such takeover is likely to,
or has ever, occurred.101  The Court finalized its reasonableness argu-
94. Id.
95. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 795 (2009).
96. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2989.
97. Id. at 2990.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2990.  The Court further emphasized, “State law . . . may not command
that public universities take action impermissible under the First Amendment.
But so long as a public university does not contravene constitutional limits its
choice to advance state-law goals through the school’s educational endeavors
stands on firm footing.” Id. at 2990–91.
100. Id. at 2991 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
53 (1983)).  Just after announcing Hastings’s policy more creditworthy due to the
alternative channels of communication available to CLS, the Court posited warn-
ing: “If restrictions on access to a limited public forum are viewpoint discrimina-
tory, the ability of a group to exist outside the forum would not cure the
constitutional shortcoming.” Id.
101. Id. at 2992 (“Students tend to self-sort and presumably will not endeavor en mass
to join—let alone seek leadership positions in—groups pursuing missions wholly
at odds with their personal beliefs.”).  Ironically, this assumption by the majority
has been interpreted by some as an invitation to demonstrate against groups
with which they disagree by gaining membership. See Meghan Grizzle, In Marti-
nez Justice Ginsburg Disregards Serious Threat of Hostile Takeovers, FIRE: FOUN-
DATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUCATION (June 29, 2010), http://www.thefire.
org/article/12007.html.  One such hostile takeover situation is quoted below:
[A]t Central Michigan University (CMU), for example, Young Americans
for Freedom (YAF), a conservative political student group, was told by
the administration that because of the university’s nondiscrimination
policy, it could not exclude from membership students who were explic-
itly seeking to dissolve the group.  In February 2007, CMU students
started a group on the social networking site Facebook.com entitled
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ment by stating that Hastings had “reasonably draw[n] a line in the
sand permitting all organizations to express what they wish but no
group to discriminate in membership.”102
Next, the Court briefly considered whether the all-comers policy
was viewpoint neutral, and concisely stated: “[i]t is . . . hard to imag-
ine a more viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student
groups to accept all comers.”103  The Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and found the open-access
policy on RSO status to be both reasonable in light of the purposes of
the forum and viewpoint-neutral, thus rejecting CLS’s free speech and
expressive association claims.104
Just before closing its 5-4 opinion, the Court recognized CLS’s ar-
gument that the all-comers policy had been selectively enforced.  Jus-
tice Ginsburg, in writing for the majority stated: “Neither the District
Court nor the Ninth Circuit addressed an argument that Hastings se-
lectively enforces its all comers policy . . . .”105  CLS urged the Su-
preme Court to resolve the issue by establishing whether Hastings
had exercised unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination through se-
lective enforcement of its all-comers policy.106  Justice Ginsburg re-
minded CLS that the Supreme Court is “a court of review, not of first




In order to establish whether Hastings discriminated against CLS
based on its viewpoint it is necessary to recall the rules governing
analysis in a limited public forum.  Both parties stipulated that Has-
tings’s RSO program constituted a limited public forum,109 thus, any
restrictions placed on speech must have been reasonable in light of the
“People Who Believe the Young Americans for Freedom is a Hate
Group,” where students posted messages suggesting ways to destroy
YAF.  One post suggested that members of the Facebook group “go to
their meetings and . . . vote eachother [sic] onto the board and dissolve
the group.
Id.
102. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2993.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2995.
105. Id.
106. Id. at n.28.
107. Id. (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 (2005)).
108. Id. at 2995 (“On remand, the Ninth Circuit may consider CLS’s pretext
argument.”).
109. Id. at 2984 n.12.
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purposes of the forum and viewpoint neutral.110  Hastings violated
CLS’s constitutional rights if it can be established that (1) the speech
participated in by CLS would otherwise be permitted in the forum,
and (2) Hastings selectively enforced its all-comers policy against CLS
solely because it disagreed with the group’s viewpoint.111  Further,
even if Hastings can convince the court on remand to examine its en-
forcement of the all-comers policy under strict scrutiny—which under
Good News is not likely112—Hastings will not be able to prove it was
achieving a compelling interest.
1. CLS’s Language Permitted in the Limited Public Forum
It must first be established that CLS participated in such speech
that would otherwise be permitted in the forum created by Hastings
through its RSO program.113  Once Hastings has created its forum it
must respect the boundaries it has itself set.114  The purposes and re-
quirements for the RSO program are clearly set forth in the majority
opinion.  The RSO program was created to: (1) “contribute to the Has-
tings community and experience,” (2) provide students with opportu-
nities to “pursue academic and social interests outside of the
classroom” (3) to “further education,” and (4) to provide leadership op-
portunities.115  In essence, “the RSO forum . . . allow[s] Hastings stu-
dents to replicate on campus a broad array of private, independent,
noncommercial organizations that is very similar to those that non-
students have formed in the outside world.”116  Hastings made no con-
tention that CLS, as a religious RSO, would frustrate any of these
purposes.117  In fact, Hastings has approved many religious groups for
RSO status including: The Jewish Law Student Association, The J.
Reuben Clark Law Society (a student group centered on beliefs of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints), and The Association of
110. Id. (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001)).
111. Id. at 2988, 2994.
112. Recall that under Good News, once viewpoint discrimination has been estab-
lished it is no longer necessary to examine the reasonableness prong of the lim-
ited public forum standard governing restrictions on speech.
113. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); see
also Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 389–90
(1993) (explaining that once a limited public forum is opened to a particular type
of speech, selectively denying access or speech based on viewpoint of a group
whose speech would otherwise be allowed in the forum constitutes viewpoint dis-
crimination; thus, it is necessary to establish whether CLS was participating in
speech that was permissible in the forum created by the RSO program).
114. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
115. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2978–79.
116. Id. at 3014 (Alito, J., dissenting).
117. See generally id.
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Muslim Law Students.118  When Hastings denied CLS official recogni-
tion as an RSO it provided only one reason: “CLS must open its mem-
bership to all students irrespective of their religious beliefs or sexual
orientation.”119  Hastings made no contention that the speech CLS en-
gaged in was not the type permitted in the forum.  In other words, if
CLS, for example, had written into its bylaws that all students were
welcome to join the group leaving out any membership limitations,
but then required that its “Statement of Faith” be recited at the invo-
cation of every meeting—denouncing sexual activity outside the bonds
of marriage between a man and a woman—Hastings likely would
have granted CLS RSO status.  Hastings would have permitted this
practice because, as the majority points out, CLS is entitled to its be-
liefs.120  Hastings only took issue with CLS’s membership limitations,
not with the group’s speech.121  Based on Hastings’s willingness in the
past to grant RSO status to religious groups, and the fact that Has-
tings cited CLS’s membership limitations as the only reason for deny-
ing the group RSO status, it is apparent that the type of speech in
which CLS engaged served the purposes of the RSO program and
would otherwise be permitted in the limited public forum.
2. Hastings’s Selective Enforcement and Viewpoint
Discrimination
Once established that CLS’s speech would otherwise be permitted
in the forum, it becomes necessary to determine if the limitation
placed on CLS’s First Amendment right to expressive association was
a result of viewpoint discrimination.  In his concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Kennedy explained that CLS would have “a substantial case on
the merits” if it could demonstrate that Hastings “enforced its policy
with the intent or purpose of discriminating or disadvantaging [the]
group on account of its views.”122  When CLS refused to change its
membership requirements, Hastings denied RSO status, thus making
CLS the only group whose application had ever been rejected.123  Such
118. See Student Organizations, UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF LAW, http://www.
uchastings.edu/student-services/student-orgs/index.html (last visited Nov. 5,
2010).
119. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2980–81.
120. Id. at 2994 n.26  (“Although registered student groups must conform their con-
duct to the Law School’s regulation by dropping access barriers, they may express
any viewpoint they wish—including a discriminatory one.” (citing Rumsfeld v. Fo-
rum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006) (emphasis
added)).
121. If CLS wanted to become a recognized RSO it would be required to drop its limi-
tations on membership and accept all potential members regardless of their belief
or sexual orientation. Id. at 2980–81.
122. Id. at 3000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 3002 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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selective enforcement of the all-comers policy amounted to viewpoint
discrimination.
The standard for determining if a statute, or policy in this case, has
been selectively enforced, and is thus in violation of the law is similar
in both the criminal and civil justice systems.124  A concise explana-
tion of the standard involved in criminal cases is laid out in
Gardenhire v. Schubert.  In Gardenhire, the court stated three factors
for determining when selective enforcement has occurred:
First, [an official] must single out a person belonging to an identifiable group,
such as those of a particular race or religion, or a group exercising constitu-
tional rights, for prosecution even though he has decided not to prosecute per-
sons belonging to that group in similar situation.  Second, [the official] must
initiate the prosecution with a discriminatory purpose. Finally, the prosecu-
tion must have a discriminatory effect on the group which the defendant be-
longs to.125
When selective enforcement is at issue “it is an absolute requirement
that the plaintiff make at least a prima facie showing” that the law or
policy was not enforced against others similarly situated.126
In his dissent, Justice Alito pointed to numerous examples in the
record where registered student groups included in their bylaws—the
very bylaws to be reviewed and approved by the same committee who
purportedly required an all-comers policy—limitations on member-
ship and leadership positions to “those who agreed with the groups’
viewpoints.”127  These student organizations “require[d] that their
leaders and/or members agree[d] with the organization’s beliefs and
purposes.”128  Justice Alito continued:
[T]he bylaws of the Hastings Democratic Caucus provided that “any full-time
student at Hastingsmay become a member of HDC so long as they do not ex-
hibit a consistent disregard and lack of respect for the objective of the organiza-
tion . . . .” The constitution of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America at
Hastings provided that every member must “adhere to the objectives of the
student chapter as well as the mission of ATLA.”  A student could become a
member of the Vietnamese American Law Society as long as the student did
not “exhibit a consistent disregard and lack of respect for the objective of the
124. Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318–19 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United
States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 1991)).
125. Id. at 319 (citing Anderson, 923 F.2d at 453); see also 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitu-
tional Law § 941 (1998) (providing examples of what constitutes selective en-
forcement for the purposes of the equal protection clause).
126. Id. (citing Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873 (6th Cir. 1997)).
127. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 3004 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 3005 n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Appellant at 14–15, CLS,
130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 06-15956 (CA9)).  It is worth noting that there is a discrep-
ancy in the case as to the policy Hastings supposedly adhered to at certain times.
Id. at 3005–06.  At one point Hastings admitted to allowing student groups to
exclude members based on viewpoint. Id.  This admission referred to the same
policy it is now claiming is an “accept all-comers” policy. Id.  In essence, Hastings
judicially admitted to allowing students to discriminate based on belief until CLS
asked to do the same thing. Id.
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organization,” which centers on a “celebrat[ion] [of] Vietnamese culture.”  Si-
lenced Right limited voting membership to students who “are committed” to
the groups “mission” of “spread[ing] the pro-life message.”  La Raza limited
voting membership to “students of Raza background.”129
In addition to the clear evidence that Hastings allowed officially
recognized student groups to limit membership and leadership based
on belief, Hastings admitted to this practice in its answer to CLS’s
complaint.  The nondiscrimination policy—which Hastings interprets
and now refers to as the all-comers policy130—“‘permit[ted] political,
social, and cultural student organizations to select officers and mem-
bers who are dedicated to a particular set of ideals or beliefs.’ ”131  The
result of such application of the all-comers policy meant, for example,
that the pro-life student group did not have to grant membership to
someone who supported a woman’s right to an abortion.  The Student
Democratic Caucus did not have to offer a leadership position to a stu-
dent affiliated with a conservative Tea Party movement.  But if CLS
wanted to be officially recognized as an RSO it would be forced to
grant membership to “avowed atheists.”132  When Hastings singled
out CLS to selectively enforce its policy, and continued to allow simi-
larly situated student groups to limit their membership based on be-
lief, Hastings participated in “patent viewpoint discrimination.”133
Hastings offered no justification as to its selective enforcement,
however, as the old cliché goes, “actions speak louder than words.”
The effect of this enforcement was clearly discriminatory.  Hastings
created a limited public forum and then violated the boundaries it set
for itself134 by denying CLS its First Amendment rights based on the
129. Id. at 3004 (internal citations omitted).
130. Id. at 3005–06.
131. Id. at 3010 (quoting Answer to First Amended Complaint, Christian Legal Soc’y
v. Kane at 7, No. C04-04 484JSW, 2006 WL 997217 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006),
2008 WL 4050121).
132. Id.
133. Id.  Eugene Volokh also notes:
Under what I call the No Governmental Viewpoint Discrimination Prin-
ciple, the government may not discriminate among speakers based on
viewpoint, at least when it subsidizes a broad range of private speakers
that are expressing their own views.  Under the No Governmental Relig-
ious Discrimination Principle, the government may not exclude religious
conduct from subsidy programs when it subsidizes equivalent secular
conduct.  Both principles mean that sometimes the government indeed
must subsidize behavior with which it disagrees, at least if it subsidizes
other behavior that differs only in its viewpoint or religiosity.  But, as I’ll
explain, these exceptions do not stop the government from imposing an-
tidiscrimination conditions on its subsidies.  Such conditions are relig-
ion-neutral, viewpoint-neutral, and generally even content-neutral, at
least if they’re applied evenhandedly to all participating groups.
Volokh, supra note 35, at 1922–23 (emphasis added).
134. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995).
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group’s Christian viewpoint.  In addition, the Court in Healy was une-
quivocal; no matter how much the university disagreed with group’s
viewpoint and philosophy “[t]he mere disagreement . . . affords no rea-
son to deny [the group] recognition.”135
As Good News explains, once viewpoint discrimination has been
established, the reasons provided for the restriction on speech are ir-
relevant.136  The exhaustive list of justifications for the all-comers pol-
icy becomes obsolete once it is established that the policy, while
neutral on its face, was enforced in a viewpoint discriminatory man-
ner.  Hastings placed CLS at a disadvantage to its competitors be-
cause of CLS’s standpoint in a forum in which CLS’s language would
otherwise be permitted.  Under the circumstances, and considering
the precedent, it would be nearly impossible for Hastings to legally
justify its actions.
B. Counter Arguments
On remand Hastings may try to contort its policy into a content-
based barrier—one that limits the time, place, or manner of the
speech—rather than a restriction based on viewpoint, triggering anal-
ysis under strict scrutiny.137  If successful, Hastings would have to
prove that the restriction on CLS’s expressive association rights
served a compelling government interest and was narrowly tailored to
achieve that end.138  The university will likely set out as a compelling
interest the need to protect students against discrimination based on
sexual orientation, and the necessity to provide students with oppor-
tunities to “pursue academic and social interests outside the class-
room . . . .”139  CLS’s answer to these interests should be two-fold: (1)
135. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 (1972).
136. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001).
137. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).  In Widmar, a registered religious
student group was denied access to university facilities because of the univer-
sity’s fear of violating the Establishment Clause. Id. at 280.  The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eight Circuit viewed the university’s regulation as content-based
discrimination on speech and subjected the university’s actions to strict scrutiny.
The university was unable to find a compelling justification for its regulation and
lost the case. Id. at 263.  The Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 277.  This case is
distinguished from Christian Legal Society in that it focuses more on equal access
rights than on forum analysis and First Amendment jurisprudence.  Further,
Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion to Widmar states the very principle
that should govern Christian Legal Society on remand: “the university . . . may
not allow its agreement or disagreement with the viewpoint of a particular
speaker to determine whether access to a forum will be granted.” Id. at 280 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 270 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)); see also Jacobs, supra
note 60, at 596 (explaining that when a government restriction on speech is cate-
gorized as a content-based restriction, it is subjected to the most rigorous scru-
tiny, “which is almost always fatal”).
139. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez (CLS), 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2971, 2997 (2010).
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CLS did not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation and (2) if
this interest is so compelling why did Hastings allow other groups to
limit membership based on viewpoint?
1. Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation
CLS’s proposed bylaws did not exclude members based on sexual
orientation.  Instead, they limited membership “on the basis of a con-
junction of conduct and the belief that that conduct is not wrong.”140
Recall that CLS required members to sign a “Statement of Faith” and
to “conduct their lives in accord with prescribed principles.”141  Among
those principle beliefs was that “sexual activity should not occur
outside of marriage between a man and a woman.”142  Under this pro-
vision, membership would be excluded not just from students who par-
ticipated in homosexual activity, but from students who engaged in
premarital, heterosexual activity, or bi-sexual activity.
Hastings would have the court believe CLS’s bylaw is an assault on
sexual orientation; when in reality, it is an avenue for CLS to demon-
strate its entitled belief that sexual activity should be reserved for
marriage between man and wife.143  CLS was not standing outside its
meetings holding signs that read: “No Homosexuals Allowed,” instead
it was asking potential members to agree with its purposes and beliefs
the same way many other RSOs had already done.  Under its own by-
laws, CLS would grant membership to a repentant homosexual144 the
same way it would admit a repentant heterosexual; what mattered to
CLS was that the student cease participating in activity contrary to
the group’s mission, and adopt the beliefs and purposes of the CLS.
CLS’s “Statement of Faith” was not an attack on homosexuals, it was
a way for CLS to limit membership based on a combination of conduct
and the belief that the conduct was not wrong.145  The majority dis-
missed this distinction without examining the practices of other
RSOs.146
140. Id. at 2990.




145. Id. at 2990 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 35–36, CLS 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371
(CA9)).
146. The Court seemed to base its dismissal, in part, on language from Lawrence v.
Texas, stating: “When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
state, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual per-
sons to discrimination.” Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558, 575
(2003)).  This comparison is flawed in that CLS’s bylaw was not targeted solely at
homosexual conduct.  While it may be argued that CLS’s bylaws had a dispropor-
tionate effect against homosexuals, such effect is generally not enough to estab-
lish unconstitutional discrimination. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (explaining that a disproportionate impact on African Americans of a writ-
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Had the Court taken the time to examine how other RSOs were
permitted to limit membership, it likely would not have discharged
CLS’s explanation so quickly.  When compared to other groups, it is
apparent that CLS was only asking to limit membership in the same
manner as other RSOs.  For example, recall that the student group
Silenced Right was permitted to limit membership to students who
were committed to the group’s mission of “spread[ing] the pro-life mes-
sage.”147  This student group clearly did not agree with certain con-
duct—the practice of receiving and/or administering an abortion—and
excluded members whose conduct and beliefs were contrary to its mis-
sion.  Thus, a student who received an abortion, and believed her ac-
tions were appropriate, could possibly be denied membership in
Silenced Right because her actions, and the belief that those actions
were not wrong, did not further the group’s mission of “spreading the
pro-life message.”  When CLS asked for an exemption from the all-
comers policy it was, in essence, asking to limit membership in the
exact same way as Silenced Right.  In actuality, CLS was not asking
for an exemption; it was asking to be treated on equal terms as other
RSOs.  If CLS is entitled to its beliefs,148 it should be entitled to prac-
tice those beliefs by limiting membership in the same way other offi-
cially recognized student groups have been permitted.
In addition, it could also be argued that because CLS is entitled to
its beliefs, it should be permitted to demonstrate those beliefs through
action.  CLS included in its Statement of Faith a commitment to the
Holy Bible as “the inspired Word of God.”149  Many Christian sects
believe their faith, or in this instance their belief, “is dead” if not ac-
companied by a demonstration of that belief.150  In other words, CLS’s
belief ceases to exist if not accompanied by some action.  Thus, to deny
CLS the right to limit membership based on this combination of belief
and conduct—the same right as was afforded to other RSOs—could
amount to a denial of CLS’s entitled right to belief.
2. The Not-So-Compelling Government Interest
Finally, the fact that RSO status was granted to groups who
clearly exclude membership and leadership positions based on view-
point runs contrary to any purported compelling interest by Hastings
that it is invested in providing students with opportunities to “pursue
ten test of verbal skill administered to applicants for employment as police of-
ficers did not warrant the conclusion that the test, which was neutral on its face,
was a purposely discriminatory device.).
147. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 3004.
148. Id. at 2994 n.26 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006) (“[registered student groups] may express any view-
point they wish—including a discriminatory one.”)).
149. Id. at 2980.
150. James 2:17 (King James) (“[F]aith, if it hath not works, is dead . . . .”).
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academic and social interests outside of the classroom . . . .”151  How
can Hastings purport to have such an interest in affording member-
ship opportunities to “all-comers” in one sentence, and permit groups
to pass bylaws that clearly exclude membership based on viewpoint in
the next without defeating its own purposes?  It can’t.
V. CONCLUSION
Hastings College of Law created a limited public forum through its
RSO program.  Under Supreme Court precedent, Hastings “must re-
spect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.”152  By selectively enforc-
ing the all-comers policy against CLS, Hastings participated in
viewpoint discrimination and violated CLS’s constitutional rights.
Upon remand the lower courts should have three options; (1) grant
CLS the exemption to the all-comers policy, (2) enforce the policy
equally throughout its RSO program, or (3) refuse to review the case
entirely.
As stated earlier, granting the exemption to the policy would result
in CLS being treated on equal terms as other RSOs who have already
been permitted to exclude members based on viewpoint.153  Since the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the policy on its face,
the lower court may enjoin Hastings to apply the policy uniformly
throughout the RSO program.  Such a response from the lower court
would result in a lose-lose situation for both Hastings and CLS.  The
university would be forced to disband multiple RSOs who were previ-
ously granted permission to exclude members and allow them to reap-
ply for RSO status with modified bylaws.  Hastings would then be
required to examine all proposed bylaws to ensure no group was at-
tempting to limit membership based on viewpoint.  This would put an
immense burden on both the existing RSOs and Hastings.  CLS would
either have to continue existing separate from the RSO program, or
change its bylaws to allow all students membership opportunities—
neither of which would be ideal for CLS.  The best case scenario for
CLS would be for the lower court to enjoin Hastings to treat CLS on
equal terms as other RSOs and allow them to limit their membership
to those who “agree with the organization’s beliefs and purposes.”154
Finally, the court on remand may refuse to review the case en-
tirely.  This could prove disastrous for minority student groups across
the country.  Universities would be permitted to create facially neu-
tral policies and selectively enforce them against minority groups sim-
151. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
152. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
153. See supra subsection III.B.1 (discussing the example of the RSO “Silenced
Right”).
154. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 3005 n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Appellant at
14–15, CLS, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 06-15956 (CA9)).
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ply because they do not agree with the group’s ideas or philosophies.
Fear of such unconstitutional backlash was evident by the plethora of
amici curiae briefs filed with the Court once the decision in the subject
case was announced.155  Hastings unjustifiably discriminated against
CLS because it did not agree with the group’s viewpoint.  CLS should
be granted permission to limit membership and be treated on equal
terms as every other RSO at the college, not subjected to discrimina-
tory selective enforcement of a disputed all-comers policy.
VI. UPDATE
In November 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to
review the issue of whether Hastings selectively applied its nondis-
crimination policy.156  The court claimed CLS had failed to preserve
for appeal its argument that Hastings selectively applied its nondis-
crimination policy.157  The appellate court bifurcated the issue into
two related discrimination arguments—an “uneven effect” argument,
and a “pretext” argument—claiming the importance of the distinction
due to the fact that the Supreme Court “remanded only the pretext
claim.”158  In the end, the Ninth Circuit refused to review the issue,
and in doing so, passed up a historical opportunity to create—or
155. After the Court’s ruling, multiple briefs of amici curiae in support of the Chris-
tian Legal Society were filed with the court.  The following list is just a sample of
the institutions: The Boy Scouts of America, Advocates International, The Foun-
dation for Individual Rights in Education, The Center for Constitutional Juris-
prudence, The Pacific Justice Institute, Agudath Israel, Cornerstone at Boise
State University, Officers of Various Christian Legal Society student Chapters,
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, and one brief written from
the Attorney Generals of thirteen different states. See Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/christian-le-
gal-society-v-martinez/ (listing all Amicus Briefs).  These institutions posited
many different arguments as to why they disagreed with the Supreme Court’s
ruling, however, they are united in believing that “the [Court of Appeals’] rul-
ing . . . threatens the fundamental right of students to associate for a common
cause and purpose, and in particular student groups who adhere to common relig-
ious beliefs.”  Brief of Amicus Curiae the Rutherford Institute in Support of Peti-
tioner at 1, CLS, 130 S. Ct. 2971  (No. 08-1371).
156. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2010).
157. Id. at 485 (“We review only issues [that] are argued specifically and distinctly in a
party’s opening brief.” (citing Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 612 F.3d 1140, 1149
n.4 (9th Cir. 2010))).
158. Id.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted:
First, CLS has argued that the school’s Nondiscrimination Policy is un-
constitutional because it prohibits discrimination on certain bases, in-
cluding religion, but not others.  Thus, even neutrally applied, the policy
leaves groups like Hastings Democratic Caucus free to limit membership
to those who agree with its core beliefs (which involve political issues),
while CLS (whose core beliefs are religious) cannot.  We call this the “un-
even effect” argument.  Second, CLS has argued that in practice Has-
tings selectively applies its policy against CLS because of its particular
beliefs.  We call this the “selective application” or “pretext” argument.
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break, for that matter—judicial boundaries in which the First Amend-
ment rights of association, speech, and religion interact.  The Ninth
Circuit did, however, leave the door open for possible litigation in the
future; if Hastings continues to selectively enforce its nondiscrimina-
tion policy, CLS is not restricted from bringing another claim.159
Though silent for now, given the impact of the issue on First Amend-
ment law, the issue is far from settled.
The distinction between these arguments is critical, because the Su-
preme Court remanded only the pretext claim.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
159. Id. at 488.
